	
  
	
  
	
  
OSGOODE	
  HALL	
  LAW	
  SCHOOL	
  
Comparative	
  Research	
  in	
  Law	
  &	
  Political	
  Economy	
  
	
  

RESEARCH	
  PAPER	
  SERIES	
  
	
  

Research	
  Paper	
  No.	
  26/2011	
  

Positivism	
  and	
  the	
  Separation	
  of	
  Law	
  and	
  
Jurisprudence	
  
	
  
Dan	
  Priel	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
Editors:	
  
Peer	
  Zumbansen	
  (Osgoode	
  Hall	
  Law	
  School,	
  Toronto,	
  Director,	
  	
  
Comparative	
  Research	
  in	
  Law	
  and	
  Political	
  Economy)	
  
John	
  W .	
  Cioffi	
  (University	
  of	
  California	
  at	
  Riverside)	
  
Lisa	
  Phillips	
  (Osgoode	
  Hall	
  Law	
  School,	
  Professor	
  of	
  Law)	
  
Leeanne	
  Footman	
  (Osgoode	
  Hall	
  Law	
  School,	
  Toronto,	
  	
  
Production	
  Editor)	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  

POSITIVISM AND THE SEPARATION OF LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE*
Dan Priel**

Abstract. This short essay argues that legal philosophy has grown excessively insular. It identifies three
ways in which this has happened: jurisprudence has become isolated from legal practice; it has adopted a
methodology that encourages a separation between legal philosophy and other interdisciplinary
approaches to law as well as other branches of philosophy; and it is committed to the substantive view
that looks at law as a distinct social practice. The result has been a discipline that speaks on ever narrower
problems mostly with itself. After presenting this state of affairs, the essay proposes various possible ways
of changing jurisprudence to make it less isolated and more engaged. They include closer links with legal
practice, political philosophy, science, and a rethinking of jurisprudential theories as models rather than a
search for the “nature” of law.

I.

The mark of contemporary analytic jurisprudence is its intellectual isolation. I have in mind
three kinds of isolation:
(1) Isolation from legal practice: legal philosophy is largely uninterested in legal practice. It is not
uncommon to find a book in legal philosophy that does not cite a single case or statute and
seems little interested in the actual attitudes of legal practitioners. Indeed, the feeling one
sometimes gets from jurisprudential work is that referring to actual legal practice is something
of a philosophical sellout, that a concern for the everyday workings of a legal system is
something that somehow undermines the purity of philosophical inquiry into law. When this
attitude is coupled with the view that legal philosophy should focus only on those features that
legal systems necessarily have, the result is the kind of inquiry that almost inevitably ignores
almost every aspect of law. This attitude is sometimes accompanied by the view that considers
looking for practical relevance to jurisprudential inquiries as somehow unnecessary or even
wrong. Jurisprudential work is justified as the search for knowledge for its own sake, one that
therefore need not have any practical relevance. It is even sometimes suggested that to look for
such practical relevance—something that could serve as a check against this sort of isolation in
jurisprudential work—is an ‘anti-philosophical’1 misunderstanding of what jurisprudence is
about. The result is that the sort of object that remains for inquiry is not recognizably the law
that most lawyers, or lay people, have in mind when they talk about law. Worse still, as a result
of this isolation jurisprudence fails at achieving even the more modest aim of illuminating
aspects of legal practice. Despite claims for providing a ‘descriptive’ account of the nature of law,
the result is something that, I suspect, would be unrecognizable to most practitioners.
*
This essay summarizes in concise form some thoughts developed in other works of mine. For fuller
argument see my essays cited below.
**
Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
1
John Gardner, “Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths”, 46 American Journal of Jurisprudence 199, 203 (2001). Quite a
few great philosophers, including some that Gardner mentions as founders of legal positivism were antiphilosophical according to that standard.
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(2) Isolationist methodology: the predominant view in legal philosophy is opposed to the
relevance of potential insights from the natural and the social sciences.2 The main ‘device’ used
is conceptual analysis from the so-called ‘internal point of view’. This expression means different
things to different scholars, and here I will not try to disentangle all those different meanings.
But in different ways they all use this expression to block inputs from other disciplines. For
H.L.A. Hart, for example, the internal point of view, among other things, was contrasted with
the methods of the natural sciences that he considered ‘useless’ for the purpose of explaining
social normative phenomena. What Hart offered instead was armchair sociology. One might
have thought Hart’s ‘descriptive’ approach that sought to understand normative behavior by
appeal to certain people’s attitudes would look favorably to psychology for some closer insight
into the way people actually reason. In reality, however, psychological literature has had little
impact on his work or the work of the many legal philosophers who have sought to further
develop his ideas.
(3) Law as distinct from other things: If the first and second isolations were negative in nature, this
one is part of the subject’s positive agenda. A second feature of the isolationist approach is the
tendency to try to define law by distinguishing it from other things, instead of focusing on what
law does or can do.3 The main focus of attention has been the boundary of law and morality,
which consciously or not, has probably contributed to another kind of isolation, this time
between legal philosophy and the rest of the legal academia, where it seems, a different
boundary—between law and politics—has been the focus of greater attention.4
A second, related, debate has been concerned with the boundary between different
jurisprudential theories, one between legal positivism and natural law, and increasingly in
recent years among legal positivists themselves. At times these debates developed to a metadebate, not about the boundaries between law and morality, but on the correct way of
understanding the boundaries between competing jurisprudential theories. In both cases, after
much work, it often seemed that what distinguishes the competing factions is very little indeed.

On this matter I say much more in “Jurisprudence between Science and the Humanities”, 4
Washington University Jurisprudence Review (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1566858,
and Dan Priel, “Toward Classical Legal Positivism”, unpublished manuscript, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1886517.
3
Legal positivists have been much influenced here by the work of Joseph Raz. See in particular his
“Legal Principles and the Limits of Law”, 81 Yale Law Journal 823 (1972). For recent statements on the
significance of this inquiry see John Gardner, “Nearly Natural Law”, 52 American Journal of Jurisprudence 1, 1314 (2007); Scott J. Shapiro, Legality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011) ch. 1.
4
If we are to believe Duncan Kennedy, “Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000”,
in David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos (eds.), The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 19, 21, then the boundary between law and morality is typically a
mid-to-late nineteenth century concern, whereas the concern with the boundary between law and
politics is the one dominating discussion in legal circles in this era. I think this is largely correct and
reflects the massive growth of law that came with the advent of the welfare state, a development that
inevitably forced law into much greater contact with politics. These developments have had no
discernable impact on analytic jurisprudence.
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II.

Hart, and the brand of legal positivism he inaugurated, played a major role in establishing these
isolations (hence my rather unkind homage to the title to his classic essay).5 We now know that
Hart had relatively little interest in the work of most legal academics;6 that he sought to
translate the question “what is law?” to the question of the connections and boundaries between
law and morality;7 that he considered his work as primarily methodologically neutral, and that
he explicitly defended a methodology of “understanding” that was designed to fulfill a task
scientific method could not.8 The way the domain of “general jurisprudence” is currently
understood, with its concern with the question of the “nature” of law, with the primary given in
it to legal validity, are all products of his isolationist attitude.
In some respect this approach has been a spectacular success story: it effectively created a
new area of inquiry. Legal philosophy, as the term is currently understood, did not exist before
the twentieth century. This may sound like an audacious claim, and obviously false one—what
about Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Hobbes, Bentham, Kant (the list goes on and on)? Where they
not legal philosophers? In a sense they were, but their work was not within that unique genre
that is twentieth century analytic jurisprudence. What I mean by this is an intellectual domain
that may be defined as “the philosophical inquiry about law that is (or purports to be) nonnormative”. None of these thinkers, nor the many other philosophers who wrote about law
throughout the centuries could be said to have engaged in this sort of inquiry. Indeed, before the
twentieth century the conscious division between jurisprudence (in this sense) and moral and
political philosophy simply did not exist. To see the difference consider between the old and the
new jurisprudence note that the concern with legal validity, that is so central to contemporary
jurisprudence, is conspicuously absent from earlier works.
As a result the works of many philosophers who do not fit this mold are now often
neglected. Bizarrely, not to say perversely, the one pre-twentieth century philosopher whose
work is closest in spirit to contemporary jurisprudence is John Austin, a minor figure in the
history of thought. Together with Hart he became a founding father of sorts of contemporary
jurisprudence,9 at the expense of the complete neglect of the work of the much greater lights of,
5
Hans Kelsen probably bears a considerable share as well, but at least in the English speaking world
his direct influence is less pronounced. His indirect influence, however, is probably immense, for it is
through him, I think, that Anglophone legal philosophy received the idea, developed earlier in German
legal positivist circles of making “legal validity” the primary concept of jurisprudence. I make these claims
tentatively as they deserve further investigation.
6
See Nicola Lacey, “Analytical Jurisprudence versus Descriptive Sociology Revisited” 84 Texas Law
Review 945, 951-53 (2006).
7
See H.L.A. Hart, “Legal Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals”, 71 Harvard Law Review 593
(1958); H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 7-8. Here it was also the work
of Joseph Raz that has been very influential.
8
See “Jurisprudence between Science and the Humanities”, supra note 2, at 36-38. On the contrast
between (humanistic) “understanding” and (scientific) “explanation” see G.H. von Wright, Explanation and
Understanding (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1971).
9
In my view there has been a subtle and unacknowledged shift from Austin to Hart in the way the
domain of jurisprudence has been understood. See Dan Priel, “H.L.A. Hart and the Invention of Legal
Philosophy,” 5 Problema: Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho (forthcoming 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1934953.
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say, David Hume, Adam Smith, Henry Sidgwick, all of whom wrote about law in a manner that
does not fit the narrow mold of analytic jurisprudence. Even Thomas Bentham and Jeremy
Hobbes, often considered early proponents of legal positivism, had to have many of their ideas
ignored and others “Austinified” in order to fir the strictures of contemporary analytic
jurisprudence.
Within these strictures, that is, when accepting the three isolations, legal positivism is true
almost by definition. Once again, you may think I am exaggerating: aren’t, say, Ronald Dworkin
or John Finnis analytic legal philosophers, who are not legal positivists? Analytic jurisprudence,
so the argument goes, is a set of research questions (primarily the concern with the question
“what is law?”) and a commitment to a particular method of addressing those questions (the
application of the methods of analytic philosophy to questions about law). Nothing in that leads
inevitably to legal positivism. The truth, however, that the three isolations go beyond these
commitments to subject-matter and method. Dworkin, despite sharing some of the isolationist
tendencies identified above, has sought to draw some links to the work of practicing lawyers, to
other fields in philosophy, as well as to the work of other legal academics. In the case of Finnis,
the way this was done was a bit more subtle: Finnis has engaged in discussion with the more
isolationist ‘descriptive’ work of Hart and Raz, but he has made it clear now that his work on
natural law is “normative, practical, moral.”10 but in the very same book he rejected a central
tenet of the isolationist attitude: the concern to separate jurisprudence from normative inquiry.
In his more recent writings in jurisprudence, he has been more explicit in rejecting the
presuppositions of Hart’s work.11
There is thus an ironic twist to Brian Leiter’s claim that “legal positivism stands as
victorious as any research program in post-World War II philosophy”.12 In a sense he is right: as
legal philosophy did not exist (in the sense explained above) before the twentieth century and as
legal positivism is in effect analytic jurisprudence with the three isolations, there is a sense in
which Leiter is clearly right. But, and this is the heart of my argument, this has been a pyrrhic
victory, for it was achieved by effectively defining competition away from the debate. The terms
of the debate—what was considered as part of the “permissible” moves within it—were set in
such a way that legal positivism was bound to end up “victorious.” By defining legal philosophy
as concerned primarily with the nature of law, by defining the nature of law as understood by
the conditions of legal validity, and by defining legal validity as understood by practitioners (and
not as the result of a broader normative inquiry), the “winner” in the debate was simply not in
question.
The interesting question, then, is why the isolationist approach has proven so attractive to
legal philosophers? This question is, of course, not susceptible to a simple answer. For Hart, for
example, part of the story probably had to do with his ethical (or rather metaethical) skepticism.
Isolating legal philosophy from moral philosophy allowed him to avoid the need to engage with
John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 418.
See John Finnis, “Law and What I Truly Should Decide,” 48 American Journal of Jurisprudence 107 (2003);
John Finnis, “H.L.A. Hart: A Twentieth Century Oxford Political Philosopher,” 54 American Journal of
Jurisprudence 161 (2009). I discuss the differences between Finnis’s methodology and that of analytic
jurisprudents at greater length in Dan Priel, “Description and Evaluation in Jurisprudence,” 29 Law and
Philosophy 633 (2010).
12
Brian Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and on Naturalism in Legal Philosophy
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 2.
10
11
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a question he felt unsure about.13 Via a somewhat different route the same is true of Kelsen
(whose ethical skepticism was more strongly and explicitly pronounced). The time in which
both wrote their main works in jurisprudence was also a period in which political philosophy
was thought “dead,”14 and so it may have seemed fruitless to attempt to tie legal philosophy to
political philosophy. But beyond these rather narrow concerns, there was perhaps also an idea,
probably not fully recognized in Hart’s work, but I think increasingly clear and intended as we
approach the present, that the isolationist approach could secure legal philosophy from being
overtaken by any other discipline. This may have reduced the opportunities for interactions
with other disciplines, but—what is in fact the very same thing—those other disciplines could
not pose a serious challenge to legal philosophy. In other words, isolationism meant both that
from within the “truth” of legal positivism could not be questioned, and from without the
questions and methods legal philosophy could not be challenged.
That this was a pyrrhic victory can be seen from the status of the subject in legal academia.
It is no secret—and I have encountered such attitudes myself from many people—that analytic
jurisprudence is no longer held in high regard in many law schools. I have heard many scholars
with background or interest in philosophy saying that they do not find the debates in the area
interesting. I have heard it from younger scholars in the United States that work in this area is
not likely to get one hired. Even in Britain where analytic jurisprudence is more prominent, in
an increasing number of law schools analytic jurisprudence is often considered a spent force.
The response one sometimes encounters among legal philosophers is that this lack of interest is
due to the fact that most academic lawyers are not philosophically sophisticated enough, or
simply not smart enough, to understand the debates. It is notable, however, that other
philosophers, including moral and political philosophers, presumably sufficiently intelligent
and philosophically astute, and working on close issues, seem equally uninterested in these
debates. I have even heard it suggested that general jurisprudence is no longer attractive because
its major questions have been, more or less, solved. That, however, to me reflects more an
implication of the isolationist attitude noted above than reality. The questions of jurisprudence
seem to have been solved only because the isolationist attitude eliminated the possibility of real
debate.
A crisp demonstration of the shift that the isolationist attitude has brought about can be
gleaned from a subtle but important shift in the meaning of “general jurisprudence.” These days
the term typically means that part of jurisprudence that talks about law in general, as opposed
to philosophical or theoretical discussion on tort, contract, intellectual property or what have
you. It is interesting to compare this to the two close but different contrasts in Bentham’s work.
Bentham distinguished between universal and local jurisprudence and between expositor and
the censor. The local/universal distinction was about “the law of such or such a nation or
nations in particular” as opposed to the “the law of all nations whatsoever.” The
expositor/censor distinction was about the distinction between “what the law is” and “what it
ought to be,”15 or in modern more parlance, roughly between the work of the doctrinal (“black
letter”) and that of the legal reformer. With regard to the “definition which there has been
Hart comes close to admitting that in Hart, supra note 7, at 620-21.
For these attitudes toward political theory (especially in Oxford) around this period see Brian Barry,
Political Argument, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990) xxxi-xxxviii.
15
Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996)
293-95.
13
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occasion here and there to intersperse” in his discussion, “particularly the definition … given of
the word law,” he considered it to belong to universal jurisprudence, although he warned (a
warning not always heeded by contemporary legal philosophers) that this usage may be
inaccurate since “in point of usage, where a man, in laying down what he apprehends to be the
law, extends his views to a few of the nations with which his own is most connected”. It is,
rather, in the “censorial line”, the normative domain that considers particular legal areas in
which “there is the greatest room for disquisitions that apply to the circumstances of all nations
alike”.16 It is this that allowed Bentham to offer his legislation drafting services for the whole
world. In other words, for the most part it was the censorial (normative) work that belonged to
universal jurisprudence, whereas the more “descriptive” expository work (what we would now
call doctrinal scholarship) that was local.
The redefinition of general jurisprudence as the part of the discussion not concerned with
particular legal areas only makes sense, is in fact necessary, to maintain one of the isolation of
jurisprudence from political theory.

III.

Legal philosophy can continue to exist in the same way it has been existing for some time now,
as a niche subject that interests an ever smaller number of people, devoid of important questions
and interesting answers. Alternatively, it can abandon the misguided Platonic search for a set of
necessary features that all laws have and join the rest of the academic world. I started with three
isolations that pervade contemporary jurisprudence. The first step to renewal would come from
trying to adopt their opposites. What this means is for the most part rather self-explanatory, but
a few comments may be in order:
(1) Jurisprudents should take more interest in legal practice and through it in politics and political theory. Too
many debates in jurisprudence are not about law but about the writings of other legal
philosophers. This is to a great extent inevitable. Part of the life of any intellectual discipline
consists of refining and challenging past ideas. But jurisprudence seems to have lost touch with
what it is supposed to be about: law at the expense of often scholastic debates among legal
philosophers.17 Here are some topics that are properly “general” and theoretical but do not fit
mainstream views as to what general jurisprudence should be about: the relationship between
law and other social institutions; law in a democracy; comparative jurisprudence; law in the
welfare state; the role and significance of path dependency in the law; evolutionary ideas in the
law; law and well-being; the political aspects of legal taxonomy; what psychological research
about morality and politics tells us about the shape law has taken, and many others. All these
topics will force legal philosophers to think more and more clearly about the actual practice of
law. As I see it, these questions are not merely efforts at diversifying or branching out. Properly
thought through they will prove valuable to anyone interested in an answer to the question
“what is law?”
Ibid. at 295; cf. Dan Priel, “One Right Answer? The Meta-Edition,” in W.J. Waluchow and Stefan
Schiaraffa, ed., The Nature of Law (forthcoming 2012), available at http//ssrn.com/abstract=1835982.
17
For similar observations and a call, with which I fully agree, for greater attention to the work of
legal theorists who paid more attention to legal practice see Sundram Soosay, “Rediscovering Fuller and
Llewellyn: Law as Custom and Process” in Maksymilian Del Mar, ed., New Waves in Philosophy of Law (London:
Routledge, 2011) 31.
16
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(2) Jurisprudents should embrace science: science is the greatest success story of the last three
centuries. And the success shows no signs of abating. Area after area that we were once told were
beyond the realm of science have proven up to the task. Jurisprudence has gone in the opposite
direction. The historical route leading from Hobbes and Bentham to Hart and Raz is one that
involves the successive cutting of whatever ties to science were left there by earlier generations
of legal philosophers. In its final stages it was the result of a conscious commitment to the view
that the fundamental questions of jurisprudence are beyond the ken of science, that
philosophical reflection is fundamentally different and in some respect opposed to scientific one.
As we have seen this attitude required both a commitment to what properly belonged to
jurisprudence and to a certain corresponding methodology. I believe there is little to support
this view and many reasons to reject it. Philosophers in other areas increasingly recognize that
science is their friend, not their enemy; legal philosophers should follow suit.
(3) Jurisprudents should attempt to offer models of law instead of identifying its essence or nature: Instead of the
search for necessary conditions for the “nature” of law, instead of looking for the existence
conditions that all legal systems necessarily have, legal philosophers should aim to compare
what may be called “models” of law. This approach aims to identify not all the features that
something must have in order to be law, but rather some features that help explain certain
important features about law. The aim here is to recognize that illumination in the explanation
of social institutions often comes from isolating certain features and offering a simplified
mechanism that explains them. In the context of law this could mean at least two different
things. One is the recognition that laws in different environments (pre-modern versus modern;
democratic versus non-democratic; in a contemporary welfare state versus before the welfare
state; in a globalized world versus the pre-globalized world) have to address different concerns
and that therefore concepts like the rule of law, obligation, or coercion, have therefore taken a
different shape. Different models can illustrate these differences. The second way is even more
interesting: we often recognize that the same function can be performed in different ways. A
steam engine and an internal combustion engine both perform a similar function even though
the way they do so is different. Similarly, different legal systems may perform the same function
through different mechanisms. Once again, jurisprudence could help not only identify
functions that legal systems perform but also suggest different models for the different ways in
which these functions may be realized.

IV.

If what I said above is true, it will mean the death of legal philosophy as the term is currently
understood by many of its practitioners. That is not to be lamented. It may also lead to the death
of legal philosophy in the broader sense of the term—philosophical reflection about law—as a
viable object of inquiry. This sort of inquiry might end up subsumed (in the way it used to be
subsumed) under moral or political philosophy, or social philosophy, or another discipline
altogether (political science, psychology). Perhaps this is the ultimate fate of an attempt at
philosophical inquiry of a social phenomenon. Perhaps jurisprudence will be able to reinvent
itself in an interesting and novel manner, as the “location” for gathering the insights from
various disciplines none of which takes special interest in the law. Jurisprudence thus
understood might be the name we give to the attempt to come up with a unifying account of
those different perspectives on law. This may prove the end of jurisprudence as we know it. This
7

means legal philosophers face a dilemma: either continue in the same manner jurisprudence is
practiced today, slowly but steadily becoming less and less relevant, less and less read, and less
and less cared for; or reinvent it in some way. Paradoxically, it is the former approach that is
more likely to keep jurisprudence alive, simply because the three isolations have created such a
secure bubble for jurisprudence that no other discipline could challenge it; and as a result of the
marginalization of jurisprudence that came with the three isolations, no-one would bother. But
in this way jurisprudence will be alive in the same way that a man in a coma is alive. Making
jurisprudence relevant risks the eliminating it as a distinct sub-discipline, as it will no longer be
able to claim for itself a unique set of questions that are beyond the purview of other disciplines.
I think it is a risk worth taking.
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